"The World and Japan" Database (Project Leader: TANAKA Akihiko)
Database of Japanese Politics and International Relations
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS); Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia (IASA), The University of Tokyo

[Title] ANNEX II: Financial Sector Reform

[Place] Toronto
[Date] June 27, 2010
[Source] G20 official website
[Full text]

1. The financial crisis has imposed huge costs. This must not be allowed to happen again. The recent financial volatility has strengthened our resolve to work together to complete financial repair and reform. We need to build a more resilient financial system that serves the needs of our economies, reduces moral hazard, limits the build-up of systemic risk and supports strong and stable economic growth.

2. Collectively we have made considerable progress toward strengthening the global financial system by fortifying prudential oversight, improving risk management, promoting transparency and continuously reinforcing international cooperation. We welcome the strong financial regulatory reform bill in the United States.

3. But there is more to be done. Further repair to the financial sector is critical to achieving sustainable global economic recovery. More work is required to restore the soundness and enhance the transparency of banks’ balance sheets and markets; and improve the corporate governance and risk management of financial firms in order to strengthen the global financial system and restore the credit needed to fuel sustainable economic growth. We welcome the decision of EU leaders to publish the results of ongoing tests on European banks to reassure markets of the resilience and transparency of the European banking system.

4. We pledge to act together to achieve the commitments to reform the financial sector made at the Washington, London and Pittsburgh Summits by the agreed or accelerated timeframes. Transition horizons will take into account the cumulative macroeconomic impact of the reforms in advanced and emerging economies.

Capital and Liquidity

5. We agreed that the core of the financial sector reform agenda rests on improving the strength of capital and liquidity and discouraging excessive leverage. We agreed to increase the quality, quantity, and international consistency of capital, to strengthen liquidity standards, to discourage excessive leverage and risk taking, and reduce procyclicality.

6. We took stock of the progress of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) towards a new global regime for bank capital and liquidity and we welcome and support its work. Substantial progress has been made on reforms that will materially raise levels of resilience of our banking systems.

• The amount of capital will be significantly higher when the new reforms are fully implemented.

• The quality of capital will be significantly improved to reinforce banks’ ability to absorb losses.

7. We support reaching agreement, at the time of the Seoul Summit, on a new capital framework that would raise capital requirements by:

• establishing a new requirement that each bank hold in Tier 1 capital, at a minimum, an increasing share of common equity, after deductions, measured as a percentage of risk-weighted assets, that enables them to withstand with going concern fully-loss-absorbing capital–without extraordinary government support – stresses of a magnitude associated with the recent financial crisis.

• moving to a globally consistent and transparent set of conservative deductions generally applied at the level of common equity, or its equivalent in the case of non- joint stock companies, over a suitable globally-consistent transition period.

8. Based on our agreement at the Pittsburgh Summit that Basel II will be adopted in all major centers by 2011, we agreed that all members will adopt the new standards and these will be phased in over a timeframe that is consistent with sustained recovery and limits market disruption, with the aim of implementation by end-2012, and a transition horizon informed by the macroeconomic impact assessment of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and BCBS.

9. Phase-in arrangements will reflect different national starting points and circumstances, with initial variance around the new standards narrowing over time as countries converge to the new global standard. Existing public sector capital injections will be grandfathered for the extent of the transition.

10. We reiterated support for the introduction of a leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to the Basel II risk-based framework with a view to migrating to Pillar I treatment after an appropriate transition period based on appropriate review and calibration. To ensure comparability, the details of the leverage ratio will be harmonized internationally, fully adjusting for differences in accounting.

11. We acknowledged the importance of the quantitative impact study currently being conducted by the BCBS that measures the potential impact of the new Basel standards and will ensure that the new capital and liquidity standards are of high quality and adequately calibrated. The BCBS- FSB macroeconomic impact study will inform the development of the phase-in period of the new standards.

12. We welcomed the BCBS agreement on a coordinated start date not later than 31 December 2011 for all elements of the revised trading book rules.

13. We support the BCBS’ work to consider the role of contingent capital in strengthening market discipline and helping to bring about a financial system where the private sector fully bears the losses on their investments. Consideration of contingent capital should be included as part of the 2010 reform package.

14. We called upon the FSB and the BCBS to report on progress of the full package of reform measures by the Seoul Summit. We recognize the critical role of the financial sector in driving a robust economy. We are committed to design a financial system which is resilient, stable and ensures the continued availability of credit.

More Intensive Supervision

15. We agreed that new, stronger rules must be complemented with more effective oversight and supervision. We are committed to the Basel Committee’s Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and tasked the FSB, in consultation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to report to our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in October 2010 on recommendations to strengthen oversight and supervision, specifically relating to the mandate, capacity and resourcing of supervisors and specific powers which should be adopted to proactively identify and address risks, including early intervention.

Resolution of Financial Institutions

16. We are following through on our commitment to reduce moral hazard in the financial system. We are committed to design and implement a system where we have the powers and tools to restructure or resolve all types of financial institutions in crisis, without taxpayers ultimately bearing the burden. These powers should facilitate “going concern” capital and liquidity restructuring as well as “gone concern” restructuring and wind-down measures. We endorsed and have committed to implement our domestic resolution powers and tools in a manner that preserves financial stability and are committed to implement the ten key recommendations on cross-border bank resolution issued by the BCBS in March 2010. In this regard, we support changes to national resolution and insolvency processes and laws where needed to provide the relevant national authorities with the capacity to cooperate and coordinate resolution actions across borders.

17. We agree that resolution regimes should provide for:

• Proper allocation of losses to reduce moral hazard and protect taxpayers;

• Continuity of critical financial services, including uninterrupted service for insured depositors;

• Credibility of the resolution regime in the market;

• Minimization of contagion;

• Advanced planning for orderly resolution and transfer of contractual relationships; and,

• Effective cooperation and information exchange domestically and among jurisdictions in the event of a failure of a cross-border institution.

Addressing Systemically Important Financial Institutions

18. We welcomed the FSB’s interim report on reducing the moral hazard risks posed by systemically important financial institutions. We recognized that more must be done to address these risks. Prudential requirements for such firms should be commensurate with the cost of their failure. We called upon the FSB to consider and develop concrete policy recommendations to effectively address problems associated with and resolve systemically important financial institutions by the Seoul Summit. This should include more intensive supervision along with consideration of financial instruments and mechanisms to encourage

market discipline, including contingent capital, bail-in options, surcharges, levies, structural constraints, and methods to haircut unsecured creditors.

19. We welcomed the substantial progress that has been made regarding the development of supervisory colleges and crisis management groups for the major complex financial institutions identified by the FSB.

20. We continue to work together to develop robust agreed-upon institution-specific recovery and rapid resolution plans for major cross-border institutions by the end of 2010. We further committed to continue working on ensuring cooperation among jurisdictions in financial institution resolution proceedings.

Financial Sector Responsibility

21. We agreed the financial sector should make a fair and substantial contribution towards paying for any burdens associated with government interventions, where they occur, to repair the financial system or fund resolution.

22. To that end, we recognized that there is a range of policy approaches. Some countries are pursuing a financial levy. Other countries are pursuing different approaches. We agreed the range of approaches would follow these principles:

• Protect taxpayers;

• Reduce risks from the financial system;

• Protect the flow of credit in good times and bad times;

• Take into account individual countries’ circumstances and options; and,

• Help promote a level playing field.

23. We thanked the IMF for its work in this area. Financial Market Infrastructure and Scope of Regulation

24. We agreed on the need to strengthen financial market infrastructure in order to reduce systemic risk, improve market efficiency, transparency and integrity. Global action is important to minimize regulatory arbitrage, promote a level playing field, and foster the widespread application of the principles of propriety, integrity, and transparency.

25. We pledged to work in a coordinated manner to accelerate the implementation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives regulation and supervision and to increase transparency and standardization. We reaffirm our commitment to trade all standardized OTC derivatives contracts on exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and clear through central counterparties (CCPs) by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade repositories (TRs). We will work towards the establishment of CCPs and TRs in line with global standards and ensure that national regulators and supervisors have access to all relevant information. In addition we agreed to pursue policy measures with respect to haircut-setting and margining practices for securities financing and OTC derivatives transactions that will reduce procyclicality and enhance financial market resilience. We recognized that much work has been done in this area. We will continue to support further progress in implementing these measures.

26. We committed to accelerate the implementation of strong measures to improve transparency and regulatory oversight of hedge funds, credit rating agencies and over-the-counter derivatives in an internationally consistent and non-discriminatory way. We also committed to improve the functioning and transparency of commodities markets. We call on credit rating agencies to increase transparency and improve quality and avoid conflicts of interest, and on national supervisors to continue to focus on these issues in conducting their oversight.

27. We committed to reduce reliance on external ratings in rules and regulations. We acknowledged the work underway at the BCBS to address adverse incentives arising from the use of external ratings in the regulatory capital framework, and at the FSB to develop general principles to reduce authorities’ and financial institutions’ reliance on external ratings. We called on them to report to our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in October 2010.

28. We acknowledged the significant work of the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO) to facilitate the exchange of information amongst regulators and supervisors, as well as IOSCO’s principles regarding the oversight of hedge funds aimed at addressing related regulatory and systemic risks.

29. We called on the FSB to review national and regional implementation of prior G-20 commitments in these areas and promote global policy cohesion and to assess and report to our Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in October 2010 if further work is required.

Accounting Standards

30. We re-emphasized the importance we place on achieving a single set of high quality improved global accounting standards. We urged the International Accounting Standards Board and the Financial Accounting Standards Board to increase their efforts to complete their convergence project by the end of 2011.

31. We encouraged the International Accounting Standards Board to further improve the involvement of stakeholders, including outreach to emerging market economies, within the framework of the independent accounting standard setting process.

Assessment and Peer Review

32. We pledged to support robust and transparent independent international assessment and peer review of our financial systems through the IMF and World Bank’s Financial Sector Assessment Program and the FSB peer review process. The mutual dependence and integrated nature of our financial system requires that we all live up to our commitments. Weak financial systems in some countries pose a threat to the stability of the international financial system. International assessment and peer review are fundamental in making the financial sector safer for all.

33. We reaffirmed the FSB’s principal role in the elaboration of international financial sector supervisory and regulatory policies and standards, co-ordination across various standard-setting bodies, and ensuring accountability for the reform agenda by conducting thematic and country peer reviews and fostering a level playing field through coherent implementation across sectors and jurisdictions. To that end, we encourage the FSB to look at ways to strengthen its capacity to keep pace with growing demands.

34. We called upon the FSB to expand upon and formalize its outreach activities beyond the membership of the G-20 to reflect the global nature of our financial system. We recognized the prominent role of the FSB, along with other important organizations including, the IMF and World Bank. These organizations, along with other international standard setters and supervisory authorities, play a central role to the health and well-being of our financial system.

35. We fully support the FSB’s thematic peer reviews as a means of fostering consistent cross-country implementation of financial and regulatory policies and to assess their effectiveness in achieving their intended results. We welcomed the FSB’s first thematic peer review report on compensation, which showed progress in the implementation of the FSB’s standards for sound compensation, but full implementation is far from complete. We encouraged all countries and financial institutions to fully implement the FSB principles and standards by year-end. We call on the FSB to undertake ongoing monitoring in this area and conduct a second thorough peer review in the second quarter of 2011. We also look forward to the results of the FSB’s thematic review of risk disclosures.

36. We acknowledged the significant progress in the FSB’s country review program. These reviews are an important complement to the IMF/World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program and provide a forum for peer learning and dialogue to address challenges. Three reviews will be completed this year.

Other International Standards and Non-cooperative Jurisdictions

37. We agreed to consider measures and mechanisms to address non-cooperative jurisdictions based on comprehensive, consistent and transparent assessment, and encourage adherence, including by providing technical support, with the support of the international financial institutions (IFIs).

38. We fully support the work of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, and welcomed progress on their peer review process, and the development of a multilateral mechanism for information exchange which will be open to all interested countries. Since our meeting in London in April 2009, the number of signed tax information agreements has increased by almost 500. We encourage the Global Forum to report to Leaders by November 2011 on progress countries have made in addressing the legal framework required to achieve an effective exchange of information. We also welcome progress on the Stolen Asset Recovery Program, and support its efforts to monitor progress to recover the proceeds of corruption. We stand ready to use countermeasures against tax havens.

39. We fully support the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and FATF-Style Regional Bodies in their fight against money laundering and terrorist financing and regular updates of a public list on jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies. We also encourage the FATF to continue monitoring and enhancing global compliance with the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing international standards.

40. We welcomed the implementation of the FSB’s evaluation process on the adherence to prudential information exchange and international cooperation standards in all jurisdictions.